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Introduction
The interaction between the study of religion and the natural sciences 
has intensified over the last thirty years. The reasons for this are both 
positive and negative. The work of several scientist-theologians, who 
have pioneered the modern debate, has been highly influential. These 
include Ian Barbour (1923–2013), Arthur Peacocke (1924–2006) 
and John Polkinghorne (1930–). Their work has reflected at some 
length on the different interfaces with the natural sciences. Each has 
delivered the Gifford Lectures and their books have been widely used 
and cited. Their work has been continued by a later generation of 
scholars including John Hedley Brooke, Keith Ward, Alister McGrath, 
Peter Harrison, Philip Clayton, Nancey Murphy and Celia Deane-
Drummond. 
Institutional factors have also contributed to the burgeoning of 
activity in science and religion. With its extensive funding of courses, 
prizes and programmes of research, the John Templeton Foundation 
has had a global effect, stimulating intense activity in different parts 
of the world. Much of this is in the field of science and religion. Allied 
to this development has been the appearance of research centres (e.g. 
The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences in Berkeley), the 
creation of dedicated academic posts in science and religion (e.g. in 
Oxford, Cambridge, Princeton and Edinburgh) and the establishment 
of several journals in the field (e.g. Zygon, Theology and Science and 
Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences).
Many leading scientists now publish popular books which not only 
communicate their subject to a wider public but engage with broader 
intellectual and cultural issues, some of which touch upon religion. We 
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might mention Stephen Hawking, Steve Jones, Martin Rees, Susan 
Blackmore, Paul Davies, Richard Dawkins and Lawrence Krauss. 
With the decline in mainstream religious institutions, many people now 
look for wisdom and illumination to our leading scientists, not only on 
matters relating to their particular disciplinary expertise. Whether this 
is a misplaced confidence is not the point – the utterances of leading 
scientists on ethical and political matters now receive more attention 
than those of bishops and moderators. We might also acknowledge 
that many of our scientists are better at writing accessible prose for a 
wider public than their colleagues in the humanities. 
A more negative reason is the attack on religion in the name of 
science. Several leading scholars have sought to employ the methods 
and findings of the natural sciences against religious faith. It is argued, 
for example, that science can displace religion as a more reliable 
and less provincial source of knowledge. It is based on reason and 
evidence, rather than blind faith in sacred texts or authority. Moreover, 
the history of conflict between science and religion, it is claimed, has 
always resulted in the victory of science and the discrediting of faith. 
The best-known scientific critic of religion is Richard Dawkins, but 
there are others, including Steven Weinberg in Texas, Peter Atkins in 
Oxford, and Lawrence Krauss in Arizona. This body of critical work 
has had more public traction than in previous generations.
Barbour’s fourfold typology
The most widely-cited typology is the fourfold distinction employed 
by Ian Barbour which classifies different models in terms of conflict, 
complementarity, dialogue and integration (Barbour, 1990: 3–30). 
These are familiar and somewhat clichéd in textbook discussions. 
In what follows, I shall deconstruct the first two types in ways that 
impinge upon the latter two, but without denying that these models 
provide some partial characterisation of approaches in different 
historical contexts. 
Conflict: The conflict model is advanced by scientific critics of 
religion and also different conservative groups within Christianity 
(and Islam) which remain distrustful of the ideological tendency of 
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much modern science. Scientific materialists argue that all explanation 
can be reduced to the laws of nature operating on the fundamental 
constituents of matter. This results in a downward movement by which 
phenomena in ethics, art and religion are to be explained in terms 
of material forces. Other forms of explanation – personal, spiritual, 
moral and aesthetic – are finally redundant besides the scientific. We 
might describe this as scientism – the extension of material forms of 
explanation to all reality, so as to exclude other explanatory principles. 
On the side of religion, there are several movements that seek to trump 
modern science by appeal to the authority of Scripture. Creation 
science denies both Big Bang cosmology and Darwinian evolution, 
appealing instead to biblical claims for a young earth and separate acts 
of creation which differentiate species. A more sophisticated approach 
is found in intelligent design theory which identifies instances of 
irreducible or improbable complexity in the biological world. Since 
these cannot be explained by material causes, appeal is made to the 
influence of an intelligent mind (i.e. God). 
Several comments may be registered about these assumptions of 
conflict. First, its reading of the history of science and religion greatly 
exaggerates the frequency of such conflictual episodes. To a significant 
extent throughout modernity, the natural sciences have been pursued 
by people of different faith perspectives. Many indeed were motivated 
by their faith to investigate the world through the methods of the 
natural sciences and often the churches lent institutional support to 
their activities. Look at the names that populate the buildings and 
streets around King’s Buildings in Edinburgh. Presbyterian Scotland 
in the nineteenth century produced leading figures whose religious 
faith informed their commitment to natural science and medicine 
– David Brewster, James Young Simpson, Lord Kelvin and James 
Clerk Maxwell to name but four. Historical investigation reveals a 
complex, varied and often symbiotic relationship between science 
and religion. The contribution of historians of science (such as John 
Hedley Brooke, Geoffrey Cantor and Peter Harrison) to understanding 
this complex interaction has been important. Their findings tend to 
resist any simple characterisation of a single dominant relationship of 
science and religion and to undermine narratives of conflict.
Episodes of conflict are relatively rare. Even the Galileo case 
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is more complex than it first appears since it seems clear that the 
ecclesiastical authorities were persuaded on scientific grounds that his 
hypothesis must be wrong. Their rejection of his findings was based 
(erroneously) not only on considerations about how to interpret the 
Bible but also on the received scientific wisdom of the day. In the case 
of Darwin, much of the anxiety generated by evolutionary theory did 
not appear until the twentieth century as cultural conflicts emerged 
under particular conditions, particularly in the USA at the time of the 
Scopes trial. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, theologians 
in Europe and North America were able to harmonise Darwinian 
accounts of evolution with a theological understanding of creation. 
This yielded different theories of ‘theistic evolution’ which were 
widely held throughout the mainline churches. Hence the early history 
of theological engagement with evolutionary science was largely one 
of accommodation rather than resistance. 
In any case, we should remember that conflict is always between 
someone’s science and another person’s religion. These are not 
organised in monolithic blocks. We need to ask whose religion and 
which science, rather than generalise about a clash of methodologies 
or worldviews. 
Complementarity or independence: This view, which may be held 
by a majority of people within our churches, claims that science 
and religion each has its own subject matter. In some respects, it’s 
a position that has been easier to maintain since the time of Darwin. 
As professional scientific guilds emerged so their practice became 
increasingly specialised and detached from ecclesiastical authorities, 
and theologians who dabbled in scientific pursuits. Religion, it 
was said, is concerned with the spiritual, personal and moral life 
of individuals and communities, whereas the domain of science is 
restricted to understanding how the physical world operates. In fact, 
this distinction is already embedded in Kant’s philosophy in the late 
eighteenth century and explains in part why many German theologians 
long before Barth were pretty dismissive of natural theology, turning 
instead to history as the locus for revelation.
For most of us, including of course scientists, the practices of 
science and religion can be compartmentalized and separated. There 
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will be many people who teach, apply or undertake research in 
science Monday–Friday but who worship in church on a Sunday, a 
synagogue on a Saturday, or a mosque on a Friday. They do not find 
any real conflict or interaction between these different parts of their 
lives, except perhaps in bringing some strongly-held moral principles 
into the laboratory or seeing their science as respectful of the divine 
creation. 
There are more methodological ways of illustrating this 
complementarity thesis. We might characterise the different domains 
of science and religion in terms of their respective responses to 
different types of question. Science is preoccupied with ‘how’ 
questions in relation to how the physical world behaves at the quantum 
level, how galaxies emerged from the Big Bang, how animals have 
evolved from earlier species which are now extinct, how our bodies 
function and how disease occurs. These are all scientific questions and 
the progress that scientists have made in addressing these over several 
centuries deserves our admiration and respect. Religion on the other 
hand attempts to address ‘why’ questions. Why is there a universe at 
all? Why does it behave in such regular and intelligible ways? Why 
are we here? Why should I love my neighbour as myself? Why is this 
action wrong? These appear to be questions of a different order from 
those facing the natural sciences. Typically, they belong to the fields 
of philosophy and theology. This is not to say that these questions can 
be readily answered, but it does indicate that there are some pressing 
existential topics that lie beyond the domain of the natural sciences. 
When Peter Atkins says that there are no why questions and that 
science will answer all the others, he’s simply whistling in the dark. 
Some philosophers of religion have adopted strategies of 
independence through the use of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. He 
speaks about our participating in different language games which 
are embedded in our familiar forms of life. These have their own 
rules and meaning according to the practice in question, and only by 
participating and learning do we acquire a knowledge of how language 
is to be used appropriately. He describes the beliefs and rituals of a 
religion as like a box of tools (Wittgenstein, 1966). These enable us to 
view the world in a particular way and to orient ourselves practically. 
Religion might then be seen as one set of language games which 
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include trust, commitment and ritual actions, whereas science is a very 
different type of language game that involves hypothesis, experiment 
and explanation of the material world. We should not think of religion 
as a primitive form of science.
The best-known model of complementarity to emerge in the 
science-religion field is Stephen Jay Gould’s ‘non-overlapping 
magisteria’ (NOMA). This is advanced as a non-competitive 
account of the relationship between science and religion (Gould, 
2001). It is intended to defuse conflict scenarios. With their different 
conceptualities and types of description, these deal with distinct 
questions that cannot be satisfactorily addressed by one single 
institution or approach. Recognition of multiple conceptualities will 
enable us to avoid any sense of a necessary conflict between these 
types of practice or institutional authorities. In a TV discussion, Steve 
Jones once used the image of a battle between a shark and a tiger to 
illustrate this point. On its home ground each is victorious, but place 
one within the domain of the other and it will be hopelessly defeated. 
Gould claims that the business of life is so complex and multi-faceted 
that we need the assistance of different magisteria in science, the arts, 
ethics and religion. Some of his secular critics regards this as a cop-
out. Gould preferred the quiet life, they said, rather than taking on the 
discredited magisterium of religion. But what is sometimes overlooked 
is how Gould recognised that science and religion will bump into 
each other from time to time and will require to negotiate their 
particular provinces. For the most part, their questions, proposals and 
activities are non-overlapping but this does not exclude conversation, 
disagreement or areas of fruitful dialogue. In recognising this, Alister 
McGrath has spoken of ‘partially overlapping magisterial (POMA)’ 
(McGrath, 2007: 17). This seems about right to me.
One of the best recent examples of this strategy is the advocacy of 
a more holistic balancing of approaches by Jonathan Sacks, a former 
Chief Rabbi in the UK. He points to the importance of a partnership 
between science and religion, where each attends to its distinctive and 
complementary functions. ‘Science takes things apart to see how they 
work. Religion puts things together to see what they mean.’ (Sacks, 
2011: 55). This is not dissimilar to McGilchrist’s ambitious project on 
showing how the activities of science and religion correspond to the 
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different hemispheres of the brain. Our civilisation needs both sides if 
it is to survive and flourish, according to this approach (McGilchrist, 
2009) – hence these approaches move quite quickly towards 
something like integration. Indeed, there may be a gesturing towards 
integration in many of the leading arguments for complementarity and 
partnership. 
This partnership motif is consistent with the view that science 
and religion have different subject matters which have occasional 
points of contact. Several of these have been prominent as the focus 
of discussion in books, conferences and journals. One reason why the 
Barbour typology is problematic is that the four models can all be 
accommodated in a single worldview. There may be areas of study in 
which conflict emerges occasionally, others that display a large measure 
of independence, a regular dialogue that should not be shunned, and 
sporadic attempts at integration that can be fruitful. If we were to take 
T. F. Torrance as a local example of someone who worked assiduously 
on the interface between science and theology, then we could detect 
evidence for all four models at work in different areas of his thought: 
he challenges non-realist views of quantum mechanics as well as 
many of the methodological assumptions in the social sciences; he 
seeks a dialogue on epistemology with the natural sciences, especially 
physics (with which he was much more comfortable than biology); 
he insists as a Barthian that Christian theology had its own distinctive 
subject matter which could only be apprehended through faith and 
the action of the Holy Spirit; and he moves towards a measure of 
integration by relocating natural theology within the framework of a 
positive theology of revelation. So all four models can work within a 
single theological project. 
Cosmological issues
Cosmology has dominated much of the science-religion debate since 
the mid-twentieth century. Though other areas of enquiry are now 
burgeoning – especially those generated by neuroscience, artificial 
intelligence and astrobiology – we should expect the debates around 
cosmology to continue. There is nothing new here. In most ancient 
cultures, God or the gods were represented as all-powerful creators only 
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partly accessible to human understanding but deserving of worship 
for creating and continually sustaining the world. The approach that 
dominated the Hebrew Bible, classical Greek philosophy, and early 
Christian theology adopted a model of spiritual or intellectual agency 
to explain the world, as opposed to some type of first physical cause 
which was like other physical causes (only more powerful). These 
accounts exhibited several unifying features. 
The cosmologies of well-known Greek philosophers such as Plato 
(c. 424–348 BCE), Aristotle (384–322 BCE) and Plotinus (c. 204–270 
CE), as well as the early Christian theologians whom these Greek 
thinkers influenced, did not restrict themselves to explaining how 
the world physically started. Although this was one feature of their 
work, various moral and spiritual considerations were also evident. 
The appeal to God as the explanation for the world was in large part 
intended to teach human beings about the nature of the soul, the proper 
aspiration of the spiritual self, the ground of value, and humankind’s 
final destiny.
Much of this repays study, not least for the recognition of our 
human limitations. In Section 29 of his well-known cosmological work 
Timaeus, a work which was to influence later Christian theological 
writers, Plato concedes that we should not look for more than a likely 
story in such difficult matters. He seemed to recognize the limits of 
speculation and the possibility of improving upon earlier accounts. 
The Timaeus is a relatively late dialogue. And like many philosophers 
and theologians, Plato may have become increasingly conscious of 
what he did not know and was unlikely ever to know this side of 
the grave. Nicholas of Cusa would later speak of the importance of 
reaching a stage of learned ignorance. 
Following the emergence of the Christian religion in the Graeco-
Roman world, theologians reflected on the ways in which the arguments 
of the classical philosophers could be integrated with what the Bible 
said about God. The pagan arguments were adapted in several ways 
and reconciled with claims contained in Genesis 1 about the creation of 
the world. Overall, the early Christian doctrine of creation continued 
to form one element within an integrated worldview representing a 
unified body of knowledge, interweaving what we would today call 
scientific, philosophical, and religious approaches to questions of the 
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origin of the universe. This type of presentation continued throughout 
much of the Middle Ages in the work of Islamic and Christian writers 
such as Al-Ghazali (1058–1111) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). 
Appeals to religious convictions to address issues of first principles 
and ultimate causes were understood as the only way to achieve a 
complete explanation of the causal processes observable all around us, 
or to reach any account of the origin of the world itself. These thinkers 
thus continued the tradition of fusing religious and scientific concerns 
into a single account.
Discussions amongst scientists about cosmic origins lie close 
to philosophical and theological arguments for a transcendent first 
cause. Stephen Hawking writes about this point of contact in his 
popular work, A Brief History of Time. Does the Big Bang require 
the postulation of God as its originator, or do more recent proposals 
in relation to inflation and quantum fluctuations suggest a scientific 
cause for the Big Bang which obviates any need for an appeal to God? 
This issue has been extensively debated. Some writers, such as Paul 
Copan and William Lane Craig in the USA, have attempted to use 
Big Bang cosmology to rehearse the ancient kalam cosmological 
argument which was employed by Islamic thinkers in the Middle Ages 
to contest Aristotle’s idea of the eternity of matter (Copan and Craig, 
2004). An infinite stretch of causes being impossible, our universe, it 
is argued, needs a first cause which itself requires no further causal 
explanation. The only candidate that can successfully fulfil this role is 
God, a necessary and self-sufficient being. The Big Bang, therefore, is 
insufficient and must be reckoned to have been caused by God. On this 
strong reading, Big Bang cosmology is seen as decisively confirming 
the theological case for creation out of nothing. Physics and theology 
lend mutual support to each other, an alliance being formed to drive 
rival interpretations from the field. 
Recent attention has switched to the concept of a multiverse, which 
has attracted the attention of physicists such as Martin Rees (2001). 
Is this an extravagant metaphysical hypothesis beyond the realm of 
scientific testing or can it play a serious role in future cosmology? 
Rees pleads for a relaxing of the principle of Ockham’s razor. Earlier 
generations have had to revise their understanding of the size and age 
of the cosmos. Perhaps this is now to continue with the assumption 
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of a multiverse. If a generative process that yields multiple sheets 
of space-time from quantum fluctuations can best explain the laws, 
composition and history of our own universe, then we should work 
with this hypothesis, test and assess its fruitfulness. Not everyone may 
be comfortable with this, but there seems something Canute-like about 
a strategy that resists any such speculation simply because it appears 
religiously unattractive. The theologian had better resort here to 
other considerations. A multiverse still raises the question of ultimate 
dependence. Where did it all come from? Is there an explanation for 
there being anything at all? Can a contingent multiverse be explained 
by a necessary Creator? These questions are still in play and remind 
us that theological explanation is not about what happened before 
or at some initial spatio-temporal point or event. The theologian 
or metaphysician is still entitled to ask the question ‘Why is there 
something rather than nothing?’ This is a question of a different order. 
Whether or not we can offer any conclusive answer rather than one 
of Plato’s likely stories, this remains an intelligible and important 
question. 
The subject of order is also one that continues to command 
philosophical and theological attention. Why does our universe appear 
everywhere regular, intelligible and ordered according to the laws of 
physics? Why are we able to make observations and frame hypotheses 
about what is happening in remote galaxies millions of light years 
away? This phenomenon of temporal order is again a longstanding 
subject of philosophical and theological reflection. Might the universe 
not equally well have been chaotic and unlawlike in its movements 
or simply reposed as a single inert lump? The ancient philosophers 
reflected on these questions which have a habit of appearing in new 
guises. Much of the science-religion dialogue is focussed on the 
anthropic principle and so-called cosmic coincidences. Is there an 
inherent bias in the system that suggests that in some way the eventual 
emergence of conscious life forms was intended? In its stronger form, 
the anthropic principle claims that the delicate fine-tuning of the 
universe provides evidence of some cosmic purpose. A universe such 
as ours with its speed of expansion, balance of chemical elements, and 
fundamental laws is peculiarly fitted to bring about stars, planets and 
conscious life forms. These ‘cosmic coincidences’ require explanation, 
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perhaps in terms of design. Freeman Dyson famously said that ‘the 
more I examine the universe and study the details of its architecture, 
the more evidence I find that the universe in some sense must have 
known that we were coming’ (Dyson, 1999: 250). 
Here of course the term ‘suggests’ is a slippery one. Is this merely 
how it looks to us from our limited perspective or does its intrinsic 
unlikelihood significantly raise the probability of an intentional creative 
process? Here again the concept of the multiverse has complicated the 
debate. If there are multiple universes with different sets of laws and 
histories, then it may be less surprising that at least one of them has 
the appearance of design to terrestrial inhabitants. Martin Rees gives 
the example of an off-the-peg tailor’s warehouse. You go shopping 
at Ralph Slater and lo and behold one of the suits is a perfect fit for 
you. But this is not because it has been designed with you in mind. 
No, it’s simply that there are so many suits on the peg that there is an 
inevitability about one of them offering the right fit to every shopper. 
This has a degree of plausibility, and it appears to weaken the anthropic 
argument. If there are many, many universes then it’s maybe less 
surprising that at least one has generated life forms. Critics, however, 
can respond that this merely resituates the argument. A multiverse that 
can generate one orderly, anthropic-friendly universe must itself have 
a particular structure or set of constraints that enable this possibility to 
be realised. There is a generating mechanism at work somewhere in 
the physical parameters of the multiverse that enables us to continue 
asking the question. 
These two broad issues – Why something? and Why order? 
– correspond of course to traditional cosmological and design 
arguments for the existence of God. They have never really gone away 
and remain a perennial source of metaphysical enquiry, even though 
the terms in which they are now raised are set by developments in 
recent cosmology. Let me offer some further lateral remarks on what 
is happening here. 
The perennial fascination with these questions persists despite 
the widespread assumption that there is a multiverse. But the 
prospect of this yielding any one theistic hypothesis that can be 
decisively confirmed seems remote. We find scientists adopting a 
range of religious positions that vary from a revived deism, to forms 
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of pantheism and Gaia theory, to more recognisable assumptions 
belonging to the Abrahamic faiths. The work of the physicist Paul 
Davies provides an interesting example (2007). He is doubtful about 
a multiverse and sceptical of claims that the universe is simply an 
unexplained brute fact. The whole presents as the work of Mind and 
is governed by some form of intentionality. But the vastness of the 
cosmos, the manifest problems of suffering, and the lack of any divine 
revelation all point towards Mind as having little interest or concern 
with homo sapiens on planet Earth. His theism is remarkably like the 
attenuated deism that is the resting place of David Hume’s Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion. There is a God at the far end of the 
universe but of little relevance to the immediate practical concerns 
of human existence. So an argument for divine existence will not 
always yield support for the providential God of the Bible. Indeed, the 
example of Aristotle pointed in this direction a long time ago. 
The temptation to use the best contemporary science to prove too 
much has often beset theologians. This can generate conflict when the 
science moves forward in another direction, and it leads to too tight 
a fit between different discourses and forms of understanding. The 
multiplicity of theisms makes it unlikely that any single version can 
draw upon exclusive scientific support. I suspect that Lane Craig’s 
argument from the Big Bang to creation out of nothing runs this risk 
of over-determination, and certainly intelligent design theory seems 
to give too many hostages to fortune at precisely this point. The lack 
of physical explanation for the bacterial flagellum provided early 
putative support for Michael Behe’s intelligent design hypothesis, but 
this now appears to have been overtaken by subsequent developments 
in the field. The poster child of ID theory is now obsolete (Fergusson, 
2009: 65–67). 
The turn from anthropocentrism
The direction of travel in this and other debates has led to questions 
being raised about the problem of anthropocentrism in our theological 
traditions. To put it crudely, we have assumed for too long that the 
world was made for us. As human beings, we are the focal point of 
divine creativity, our story providing the dominant narrative. The 
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pattern of the creeds and liturgy suggests this, as it moves from creation 
to fall, to redemption and then eschatological consummation. The 
human story is the key to creation with the incarnation of the Logos as 
a human being at its centre. Is this sustainable? The size and structure 
of the cosmos now raise the question of whether there are myriad 
life forms in other galaxies. Rees considers this the most fascinating 
question of our age, though the jury is still out on the probability. A 
scientist in Princeton recently told me that he conducted a straw poll 
amongst his colleagues to ascertain whether they believed in extra-
terrestrial life. He reported that the answers were ‘all over the place’, 
ranging from pretty much zero to one on the probability scale. But the 
discovery of extra-terrestrial life would certainly require the revision 
of some earlier assumptions about human exclusivity in the sight of 
God, and a deflating of some forms of anthropocentrism. Presumably, 
the multiverse also leads in the same direction. A multiplication of 
universes must raise the possibility that there are life forms not just 
elsewhere in our own cosmos but in other universes that have come 
and gone without entering into possible contact with our own. In any 
case, anthropocentrism has come under criticism from other areas of 
study – biblical scholarship, ethics and fresh readings of the history 
of theology. 
With its doctrine of the imago Dei, Christian theology has invested 
in accounts of human uniqueness, which specify the distinctiveness 
of our condition and our particular location in the drama of creation 
and redemption. The making of human beings according to the divine 
image in Genesis 1:26–27 appears to assign to our species particular 
powers and functions which set us apart from other animals. In the 
history of the Christian tradition, theologians including Augustine, 
Aquinas and Calvin tended to identify the imago Dei with our spiritual 
and intellectual powers which reside in the immaterial soul. It was the 
soul or mind, above all else, that set human beings apart from other 
species. The story of evolution has problematized this in various ways. 
First, it seems clear that we have evolved from other hominid species 
over about two million years and that our cognitive capacities belong 
on a continuum with those of earlier species. Human beings have of 
course evolved in quite particular ways with respect to our linguistic 
and symbolic powers but these have emerged in recent evolutionary 
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history and are embedded in our animal existence which is shared with 
other species. Tool-making, social cooperation, patterns of mating, 
and rituals have all evolved along with changes to the human body, 
especially the brain. These processes need to be understood in relation 
to the physical environment shared with other species.
Work in this field has resulted in at least two theological shifts; 
these provide a good example of the mobility of theology in relation to 
the insights of other disciplines. First, the earlier tendency to identify 
the image of God with a particular spiritual or cognitive component 
needs to be abandoned or at least modified. More functional and 
relational accounts of the image of God tend to be preferred, which 
do not over-specify a single attribute or ontological element of being 
human. The image of God is more about a set of responsibilities and 
tasks exercised before God and other creatures than it is about the 
possession of an immortal soul. This makes better sense not only 
of what modern science suggests, but it is also more attuned to the 
exegetical insights into Genesis 1:26–27. 
More holistic accounts of creation are advanced. These stress the 
companionship of other species, their place in God’s providential 
order, and the inclusiveness of Christ’s redemption – its scope is 
creaturely and not merely human. A good example of this shift is in 
David Clough’s recent attempt to produce a systematic theology of 
animals (2012). Work on the interface with social anthropology also 
reveals the extent to which humans have evolved in ecological niches 
shared and determined by other species. These have contributed 
significantly to the ways in which we have developed as a species, 
while also pointing to our shaping of the environment, not always in 
beneficial ways. This aspect of the science-religion dialogue promises 
to be a fruitful one in the years ahead through the work of scholars 
such as Agustin Fuentes at Notre Dame in the USA, the 2018 Gifford 
Lecturer in Edinburgh.
Is this a conversation worth having?
Finally, let me offer some comment on those who regard these 
conversations with science to be theologically misplaced, a speculative 
distraction at best and a temptation to idolatry at worst. Here we are in 
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the neighbourhood of Karl Barth’s objection to natural theology as the 
antichrist. Several features of this line of criticism can be discerned. 
Debates in science and religion, it might be claimed, are remote from 
the existential and ethical concerns of human beings. What difference 
does it make to me in my struggle to love God and my neighbour 
whether there is a multiverse or whether the design argument has any 
validity? Are these questions for the speculatively-minded only, rather 
than religiously vital issues that confront faith communities today? 
It is also said that engagement in the dialogue frequently results in a 
theological reductionism. Typically, this is a liberal Protestant exercise 
which attempts to gain some intellectual respectability for theology by 
reducing it to the minimum that is readily consistent with the latest 
scientific research. By contrast, a strong theology will take its bearings 
from Scripture and tradition, it is argued. Its object of concern is the 
crucified Christ not the latest cosmological theory. The multiplicity 
of theologies and religious theories that populate conversations with 
science lead us into a swamp of unhelpful conjecture and intellectual 
uncertainty. Dialogue with science will become at best only an 
occasional exercise and of little import to the central tasks of theology, 
preaching and Christian mission. (Given the inaccessible prose and 
convoluted nature of so much academic theology these days, there is 
a rich irony in this criticism.) To all this, I respond with the following 
concluding considerations. 
Many of the debates in science and religion are actually much 
closer to home as far as the vital interests of faith communities are 
concerned. These include important discussions about the nature of 
the person, the function of artificial technology, the ethics of genetic 
modification, and climate change. Much of the discussion is already 
ethically situated in ways that require theological attention and 
rigorous engagement. If we don’t commit to these debates, theology 
will become increasingly isolated from mainstream cultural activity.
The more speculative questions are part and parcel of any 
worldview that seeks to be comprehensive in its outlook. Without a 
likely story to support our deepest existential and moral commitments 
these are in constant danger of drifting or losing their motivational 
force. Some sense of our wider metaphysical and cosmological 
context will be required for a religious orientation, even if this is often 
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tentative, imprecise and unexpressed. William James once wrote: 
‘It makes a tremendous emotional and practical difference to one 
whether one accepts the universe in the drab discoloured way of stoic 
resignation to necessity, or with the passionate happiness of Christian 
saints.’ (James, 1960: 59).
This points to the pastoral significance of many of the questions 
that arise in science and religion discussions. These are intriguing 
not simply because they are the stock-in-trade of theologians, 
philosophers and metaphysicians. Similar questions beset people in 
our congregations, more of whom are trained in the sciences than ever 
before. And it behoves us to offer them some resources and ways of 
thinking that respond constructively to their intellectual anxieties and 
concerns. 
Note
1. This essay was originally delivered as a lecture at the Scottish 
Church Theology Society, Peebles, 17 January 2018.
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